The Meaningfulness of Metaphysics within certain systems by Hubbeling, H.G.
  
 University of Groningen




IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
1975
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Hubbeling, H. G. (1975). The Meaningfulness of Metaphysics within certain systems. Erkenntnis, 9(3), 401-
409.
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
H. G. HUBBEL ING 
THE MEANINGFULNESS OF  METAPHYSICS  
WITHIN  CERTAIN  SYSTEMS 
In reacting to my little book Language, Logic and Criterion (Amsterdam- 
Assen, 1971) Dr Barth sets forth some fundamental problems in philoso- 
phy. They are very important for every attempt to treat traditional 
philosophical problems with the help of modern logical methods. I
would be very glad to make the following small contribution to the dis- 
cussion. First of all I should like to make the main purpose of my book 
dear. According to me there is not one unique system in philosophy. Not 
only in the trivial sense that each philosopher has his own system, but also 
that there are many systems of logical empiricism for each philosopher 
individually. These systems vary according to the strength and strictness of 
their logical and empirical presuppositions. In a first preliminary approach 
we may state that the strictness and strength of each system are in an 
inverse proportion to each other, i.e. the stronger a system is (i.e. the more 
one can prove in that system), the less strict it is and vice versa. So one 
has e.g. systems based on intuitionistic logic, on classical logic, on 
dialectical logic, etc.; systems with and without modal logic; systems in 
which a reference to mystical experience is permitted and systems in 
which this is not so, etc. 1 So any answer to a philosophical question can 
only be given within a certain system. With the help of this method of ad- 
mitting a variety of systems one can try to give as strict a foundation to 
each answer as possible. Whether one will commit oneself to a certain 
answer is another question. Of course, the stricter a system is, the better, 
but on the other hand: the more a system can explain the better it is. The 
strictest systems must leave many problems untouched. Whether meta- 
physics is possible depends on the system that is used. I hope to have 
shown in my book that these systems are respectable (i.e. that they have a 
sufficient degree of plausibility), but I do not pretend that I can prove 
that metaphysics i possible in every system. Where in the hierarchy of 
systems the 'respectable' systems (i.e. the systems with an acceptable de- 
gree of plausibility) ends and the doubtful systems begin is a matter of 
personal and/or common decision. A common decision is made by a 
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group of scientists or philosophers. It also depends on the cultural and 
historical situation in which one lives. 
The advantage of this method is that one acquires a clear insight in the 
presuppositions of the various answers and theories in philosophy. This 
method is also relevant to a logical reconstruction f philosophical argu- 
ments in the past. It may lead to a fair discussion. 
Now I should like to answer Barth's critical and important questions. 
As far as I can see they consist of the following two problems: 
(1) Is modal logic necessary in every meta-language of a non-modal 
logic? 
(2) Can we give a meaning to the concepts 'metaphysical entities' and 
'metaphysically possible worlds'? 
As to the first question my standpoint quoted by Barth stemmed from 
the following considerations. Systems without modal logic are of course 
stricter than systems with modal logic, provided they do not differ in 
other respects also. My remark was intended to make modal logic 
respectable in the eyes of those who thought modal logic irrelevant o 
philosophy. According to my opinion one needs modal logic in order to 
give a foundation to ordinary non-modal logic, for modal logic is, at 
least in a certain approach as we shall see, required in the meta-language 
of the non-modal logic. And this is important, if one wants to make use 
of modal logic so as to solve traditional philosophical problems. Barth's 
reference to model-theory does not refute my argument, for I used this in 
a more syntactical approach. In this approach the semantic concepts in 
the meta-language are restricted to the notions 'true' and 'false'. And in 
such approach a reference to modal logic is needed for a foundation of 
ordinary non-modal logic as is shown also by the quotations brought 
forward by Barth. The model-approach is not a contradiction of this. 
"A  wffS is valid if it is valid with respect to every model" 2 is synonymous 
with "A wffS is valid (true) in all possible worlds" which is a customary 
semantic interpretation of the modal logical expression "A wff S is neces- 
sarily true". Besides, if I am not permitted to use modal logic, but I may 
refer to model-theoretical notions like 'possible worlds', I might also give 
meaningfulness to certain metaphysical statements. I can very often prove 
the same statements with the help of set theory (used in model theory) 
as with the help of (modal) logic. I think one of the main dividing lines 
between those systems that permit metaphysical statements (when proper 
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additional premises are added) and those that deny this possibility is that 
between classical (modal) logic or classical set theory (i.e. set theory with 
one of the following principles: (i) the axiom of choice, (ii) the axiom of 
well ordering (Zermelo's axiom), (iii) Zorn's lemma, which are inferable 
from each other) on the one hand and intuitionistic logic and set theory 
on the other hand, provided that the systems do not differ in other re- 
spects. Elsewhere a I gave e.g. a new logical reconstruction f the cosmo- 
logical proof of God's existence within a modal logical system $5, but 
also in classical set theory. Of course this proof has some presuppositions 
that might be questioned. The main presupposition is the multiple appli- 
cation of the rule 'ex nihilo nihil fit' (or every state of affairs must have a 
sufficient ground in the Leibnizian formulation; every state of affairs 
must have a necessary or a necessary and sufficient ground in a modern 
logical formulation). We will come to this in a moment. But I would 
emphasize that I do not pretend to have given a 'definite' proof, I only 
wartted to give a proof with the strictest possible presuppositions. And 
I hope to have shown that these presuppositions are respectable. But it is 
always possible to use stricter systems in which the proof is not valid. 
Even more important is Barth's challenge to give a meaning to meta- 
physical entities and to metaphysically possible worlds. I think that her 
challenge is justified and I shall try to answer it. In this, I suppose that 
the meaning of a sentence or a word can also be determined by what can 
be inferred from it. Thus in intuitionistic logic the negation-sign '--a' 
(e.g. in '~p ' )means  omething else than in classical ogic, because in 
classical logic we can infer 'p' from '--1 (-Tp)', which we cannot in intui- 
tionistic logic. Or, in a purely philosophical context: the word 'decisive' 
in the expression "the moment in time has a decisive significance" has in 
Kierkegaard 4 not the same meaning as in Marxist philosophy, because 
Kierkegaard raws quite different conclusions from it. Barth defends in 
her excellent book The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy a 
similar position. 5 Therefore the meaning of words and sentences also 
depends on the system in which they are used. So in the strictest systems 
no meaning can be given to metaphysical entities like God, perfect being, 
etc. In the systems in which I speak metaphysically (about God, etc.) I 
make a multiple use of the rule mentioned above ('ex nihilo nihil fit'), i.e. 
applying it within systems and to systems as a whole in their relation to 
other systems. Using this rule (for the way in which this is done I must 
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refer to my book and to the article mentioned in note 3) we must postulate 
God as necessary being, i.e. a being present in all possible worlds that 
can be thought of. And vice versa: if I use the word 'God' as 'necessary 
being' meaningfully, I can infer the multiple validity of this rule. 
But whether one chooses to accept he multiple use of this rule is a dif- 
ferent matter. Of course, systems including modal logic, but not including 
this rule are certainly possible. Although I do not exclude beforehand 
that metaphysics i  possible in the latter systems also, this is not the way 
in which I have done it. Of course, one can have one's doubts with 
respect o the multiple validity of the rule 'ex nihilo nihil fit'. But on the 
other hand one can easily show that the application of this rule (in this 
or some synonymous formulation s) can help to solve some problems in 
inductive logic. As far as I can see we cannot build up a system of pre- 
dictable processes for the purpose of checking hypotheses without pre- 
supposing the multiple validity of this rule both for the processes within 
the system and for the system as a whole. (i) Every change in the system 
must have a cause and (ii) the set of causes with which we operate to 
explain the changes (the sysem as a whole) is to remain the same during 
our predicting and checking. Both (i) and (ii) are applications of the rule 
"ex nihilo nihil fit', and this is also the way in which the rule is used in my 
reconstruction of the cosmological argument. So I think the rule in 
question is at least respectable. On the other hand I do not exclude that 
the problems of inductive logic can be solved otherwise. I would by no 
means pretend that the 'case of metaphysics' i  settled once and for all. 
I do not try to make metaphysical statements irrefutable. But they must 
be refuted in their own way. It is unfair and illogical to require that 
metaphysical statements (as recta-language statements) must be refutable 
by way of experiment, i.e. in an object language. Of course, a meta- 
language can contain words referring to objects, but in that case their 
function is different, just as (in another approach) a predicate of a higher 
type may have the same form as that of a lower type, as e.g. the 'r in 
Barth's criticism of my attempt to strengthen Hartshorne's version of 
Anselm's ontological argument with the help of Peirce's law is correct. 
I tried to reduce the presuppositions of Hartshorne's ontological argu- 
ment to the premise that it is possible to speak of the necessity of a perfect 
being or in other words: that the concept of a perfect being is not self- 
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contradictory. I did not and do not pretend that it is possible to prove 
that this is so with presuppositions that are beyond all doubt. We will 
come to this in a moment. Hartshorne also used the so called Anselm's 
principle 'q =~ Lq' (q strictly implies Lq, where "q' means "There is a per- 
fect being" or "perfection exists"). I tried to use Peirce's law in order to 
make the validity of this principle dependent on the question mentioned 
above, viz. the meaningfulness of the concept of a perfect being. For if the 
concept of a perfect being is meaningful, it is at least logically possible 
and thus Hartshorne's argument becomes valid. I give now Hartshorne's 
well-known argument in the following lines, using a modern notation. 7 
(1) q =~Lq 'Anselm's principle': perfection could not exist 
contingently. 
(2) Lq v - -1Lq Excluded middle. 
(3) "-nLq ~ L-'n Lq A law in Ss. 
(4) Lq vLnLq  Inference from 2 and 3. 
(5) L~Lq ~L-nq  Inference from 1: modal form of transposition. 
(6) Lq vL"nq Inference from 4 and 5. 
(7) -1L-n q The concept of a perfect being is not self-contra- 
dictory and thus at least logically possible. According to me this step 
should be considered as an added premise. Hartshorne justified this step 
as an intuitive postulate or as a conclusion from other theistic arguments. 
(8) Lq Inference from 6 and 7. 
(9) Lq =r q Modal axiom. 
(10) q Inference from 8 and 9. 
Barth is,  however, completely right in pointing out that 
(1) ((q =~ p) -~ q) ~ q, i.e. (L(q ~ p) ~ q) ~ q, 
is not a law in Ss and therefore not in any of the other, stricter modal 
systems. In preparing my answer I investigated, whether 
(2) (q =~ p) =~ q) =~ q, i.e. L(L(L(q ~ p) ~ q) ~ q), 
is a law in $5. But using the method of the modal conjunctive normal 
form s we can reduce (2) to: 
(2') (L (7  q v p) v Lq) & (Lq v M~ q), [(2') is equivalent to (2)]. 
Now the second part of the conjunction is a logical tautology, but the first 
part is not and so (2) is not a law in Ss. Now we can try to acquire some 
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'modal Peirce's law' by changing ' L (~ q v p)' in (2') into 'M(~ q v p)': 
(3') (M( -nqvp)v  Lq)&(Lq  v M-nq) .  
From (3'), which is a tautology in Ss, we can 'work back' to formula 
(3) (M(q ---, p) =~ q) =~ q, i.e. L(L (M(q  ---, p) ---, q) ---, q). 
As (3) is equivalent to (3'), (3) is now a theorem in Ss. 
But we have no use for this theorem in Hartshorne's proof. 'M(q ---, Lq)' 
is now a very weak premise; as a matter of fact it is already a theorem in 
$5. But if we use 'M(q .--, Lq)" as step 1 in Hartshorne's proof, step 5 is 
no longer possible. But another 'modal Peirce's law' is valid in Ss : 
(4) ((q ~ p) =~ q) =r q, i.e. L(L((q ~ p) ~ q) ~ q). 
For (4) is equivalent to 
(4') M(--nq v (p & --nq)) v Lq,  
which is a theorem in $5. So if in Hartshorne's proof we change the strict 
implications into ordinary (material) implications we can again make 
'Anselm's principle' dependent on the meaningfulness of the concept of 
a perfect being. For if we add the meaningfulness of q(Mq or -7 L-n q) to 
the premises of Hartshorne's proof, we can infer q from 'q ---, Lq' and so 
claim that we have proved 
(5) (q .--, Lq) =:, q, i.e. L((q ~ Lq) --', q), 
thereby changing an inference into a strict implication. From (5) we can 
infer 'q' according to 'modal Peirce's law (4)'. The term 'modal Peirce's 
law' is by the way introduced here and is not a commonly accepted term 
as far as I know. 
If my operating with the 'modal Peirce's law' is not accepted, we must 
presuppose two premises in Hartshorne's proof: viz. the meaningfulness 
of the concept of a perfect being and the truth of 'q =:, Lq'. 
But whatever the meaning and relevance of all this is, it does not dis- 
charge me from Barth's requirement to give some meaning to the concept 
of a perfect being. And there the main difficulty arises. I do not think it 
can be done beyond all doubt, but the best way seems to me the following. 
We presuppose that all complex states of affairs can be analysed into 
elementary states of affairs and that we can ascribe to every elementary 
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state of affairs a degree of desirability (goodness if you like). Now every 
elementary state of affairs might cause other states of affairs. So besides 
its own intrinsic degree of desirability every state of affairs has also a 
derived degree of desirability, that can be computed in a D-calculusP So 
we can, at least in principle, have an absolute degree of desirability that is 
computed from the intrinsic and the derived egrees of desirability of each 
elementary and complex state of affairs. We can compare the absolute 
degree of desirability of each state of affairs with its negation: D~p and 
Dp7 p, where the indices under D (ct and fl) indicate the respective degrees 
of desirability. 
Now a perfect being may be defined as that being that produces p if 
~t > fl and -7 p if ~ < fl, if it is in its power to produce ither p or -1 p. If we 
identify this perfect being with God we must still maintain the clause 'in 
its power', because God cannot produce logical contradictions, but if 
we add a proper definition of God's almightiness, we may omit this clause. 
All this might seem plausible at first sight and I will not deny that it has 
at least some plausibility. But we have presupposed: 
(i) that there is a hierarchy of desirabilities (hierarchy of values); 
(ii) that there is a complete knowledge of all causal relations between 
all states of affairs; 
(iii) that our D-calculus is correct. 
Now (i) is not commonly accepted, but one can give many arguments 
for it and it is at least held also by some atheistic philosophers. A further 
difficulty is that the order of the hierarchy of desirabilities i not a total 
(linear) order, but a half order. In other words: there are incomparable 
desirabilities. We might solve this problem in two ways: either (1) we 
might weaken the concept of a perfect being in that it is not always pos- 
sible (even not for this being) to choose between p and -1 p; or (2) (which 
I would prefer) we presuppose a function that maps the original hierarchy 
of desirabilities onto a new hierarchy that is a totally ordered set. This is 
by the way normal ethical practice, as we very often have to give an order 
of priority to incomparable things. The difference is that a perfect being 
might know this mapping function, whereas we only guess it. 
Thus (i) and (ii) presuppose the concept of an all knowing being, to 
which it is at least in my opinion less difficult to give a meaning than to 
the concept of a perfect being. The 'ideal observer' is anyway a well- 
known construction i  many an argument. Perhaps better defining de- 
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scriptions of the concept of a perfect being might be possible, but I do not 
see them at the present moment.  
I hope that the purpose of my 'logical reconstructivism' is dear,  viz. to 
give a defence of certain arguments hat is as strict as possible. Here I have 
done this for certain metaphysical approaches without pretending that 
the problems dealt with are definitely solved. Neither do I hold that 
metaphysical problems must  be solved first before other (philosophical 
or scientific) problems can be dealt with, the mistake of so many a tradi- 
t ional philosopher. Whether traditional philosophers are pleased with my 
defence, I am not sure. They usually consider my approach too sceptical, 
which it probably is. But I think in this way a fair discussion is possible 
in which arguments can be defended and refuted. But of course it remains 
true what I often say to my students: the only thing you can be sure of in 
philosophy is an inference within a system. 
University o f  Groningen 
NOTES 
1 Of course the relation between strictness and strength is more complicated than is 
sketched here, because the strength of a system does not only depend on rules of in- 
ference and axioms, but also on rules of meaning. But given the same set of primitive 
meaningful statements in two different systems our thesis of an inverse proportion 
between strictness and strength will hold. Another objection to this thesis may stem 
from the consideration that the addition of one or more axioms may change an induc- 
tive proof into a deductive one, thus making the proof more strict. To this I might 
answer that in that case the proof is certainly more exact, but the system as a whole not 
more strict, thus perhaps limiting the use of the concept 'strict'. Moreover, according 
to my opinion all inductive reasoning presupposes deductive schemata of inference 
(see e.g. my remarks in a review of Barth's book mentioned in note 5 in ,41gemeen 
Nederlands Tijdschrift veer W#sbegeerte, 65e jrg., aft. 3, juli 1973, p. 203ff). 
2 I. Copi, Symbolic Logic, 2nd edition, London, 1965, p. 308. Mrs Barth quotes the 
third edition (p. 314). 
a H. G. Hubbeling, 'Logic and Experience in Spinoza's Mysticism' in: J. G. van der 
Bend (ed.), Spinoza on Knowing, Being and Freedom. Proceedings of the Spinoza Sym- 
posium at the International School of Philosophy in the Netherlands (Leusden, 
September 1973), p. 142f (note 16). 
40ieblikket in Tiden have afgj~rende Betydning' (S. Kierkegaard, PhlTosophiske 
Smuler. Udgivet med Indledning og Kommentar fNiels Thulstrup, Kobenhavn, 1955, 
p. 11ff; English translation Philosophical Fragments, transl, by D. Swenson, rev. by 
H. V. Hong, London, 1969, p. 16ff.) 
5 Cp. E. M. Barth, The Logic of the ,4rticles in Traditional Philosophy..4 Contribution 
to the Study of Conceptual Structures, Dordrecht, 1974, p. 84ff. (A translation of 
E. M. Barth, De logica van de lidwoorden in de traditionele filosofie, L iden, 1971). 
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e Cp. for a discussion of this rule and some of its synonymous forms: A. McKinnon, 
Falsification and Belief, The Hague/Paris, 1970 p. 28ff. 
Cp. C. Hartshorne, The Logic of Perfection and other Essays in Neoclassical Meta- 
physics, Lasalle (Ill.), 1962, p. 51. 
s G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, An Introduction to Modal Logic, London, 1968, 
p. 54ff; p. l16ff. 
9 Cp. H.G.  Huhbeling, 'Zijn ethische uitsprakcn wctenschappelijk fundcerbaar? 
Enkele opmerkingen over de wetenschappelijkhcid van de ethiek', in T~idschrifl voor 
Filosofie, 33e jaargang-nummer 1-maart 1973 (p. 41-65)p. 60ft. 
